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Kyle Stiegert, Archie Amir Ardalan, and Thomas Marsh
This study utilized intra-firm, socio-cultural, geographical-proximity, and political-stability variables to explain bi-
modal foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns by agri-food and beverage multinational companies into and within 
the European Union. A logit framework incorporated a unique-count database of firm-level investment patterns from 
1987–1998. The results showed the 1992 structural changes under the Maastricht Treaty increased the probability of 
wholly owned FDI modes such as greenfields and buyouts. The model also found that past modal strategies of firms, 
language barriers, and exchange-rate volatility all correctly explained modal investment patterns. The results provide 
important contributions toward understanding modal investment strategies including the role of macroeconomic changes 
within a custom union.
A popular way for a firm to secure a business pres-
ence in a foreign nation is through foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in production, marketing, and/or 
distribution facilities. Formally defined, FDI is an 
investment in which a multinational enterprise 
(MNE) acquires a substantial controlling interest 
in a foreign firm or in some other manner estab-
lishes fixed assets on foreign soil. Prior to 1970, 
multinational operations were often characterized 
as an exclusively American institution (Erdilek 
1985). However, during the 1970s the U.S. shifted 
from being the largest “home” country to being 
the largest “host” country. Indeed, post-1960s FDI 
activities had quickly become far less centralized, 
with an active exchange of capital assets moving 
within the “Triad” group (United States, European 
Union, Japan). Table 1 contains the share of FDI 
monetary inflows to various regions around the 
world. The average share of inflow into the EU 
was over 32% from 1995–1998. The EU region 
was the first major recipient of FDI, and the uni-
fication of the European countries around a single 
currency appears to have accelerated this expan-
sion. At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the opening of Eastern Bloc countries 
to the global economy represent potential business 
opportunities for multinational companies, which 
may use the EU as a base from which to serve the 
rest of the continent.
In one sense, FDI is simply trade in capital. 
However, unlike pure trade, FDI usually involves 
long-term irreversible commitments, which imply 
greater risks. It also challenges classical economic 
thinking by suggesting that the optimal firm-level 
strategy differs greatly from the one that orga-
nizes economic activity through efficient market 
coordination. One essential function of FDI is to 
bring business units from different nations under a 
common ownership structure. This allows firms to 
replace arms-length transactions with a hierarchical 
internal structure that controls transaction prices, 
information, outputs, networks of business partners, 
and other resources. 
The empirical literature on FDI is broadly clas-
sified into two groups: analysis of FDI flows and 
analysis to explain modal strategies in FDI. A vast 
literature exists within the former group. Recent 
additions include Chakrabarti (2003), new theory; 
Sethiet al. (2003), new theory; Belderbos and Sleu-
waegan (1998), tariff jumping; Hooker and Caswell 
(1996), nontariff barriers; and Head, Mayer, and 
Ries (2002), FDI and oligopoly. Earlier research 
includes Buckley and Casson (1976); Daniels and 
Radebaugh (1994); Eiteman, Stonehill, and Mof-
fet (1998); Hymer (1976); Kindleberger (1969); 
and Korbin (1982). Numerous theories have been 
proposed to explain FDI levels, including gaining 
access to scarce raw materials, lowering production 
costs, penetrating local markets, changes in markets 
due to the liberalization of trade, the deregulation 
of investment and capital markets, tax differences 
across nations, and fiercer competition brought 
about by globalization and technological changes. 
Under these conditions, expanding firm size and 
managing a portfolio of locational assets becomes 
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more important for MNEs, as this enables them to 
take advantage of resources and markets worldwide. 
The research for FDI flows is also driven by the 
search for financial, managerial, and operational 
synergies as well as by economies of scale and 
subsequent market power. Finally, developing an 
extensive global network may allow MNEs first-
mover advantages in developing and offering new 
technologies in various locations. 
Theories explaining modal FDI choice began as 
an outcropping from the early literature trying to 
explain why firms replace trade with FDI (Hymer 
1976). Buckley and Casson (1976) extended the 
literature on modal choice by including contracting 
as an additional option for trade and FDI. Additional 
work has shed light on narrower questions including 
greenfields versus acquisition (Hennert and Park 
1993), transactions costs (Erramilli and Rao 1993), 
and equity versus non-equity FDI (Schaan 1998; 
Shane 1996a, 1996b). Buckley and Casson (1998) 
represent the first and only attempt at synthesizing 
modal behavior in a single model with twelve pos-
sible entry strategies across an array of possible 
market conditions. The results provided a useful 
platform for understanding the basic incentives 
underlying many complex modal questions. 
The research presented in this paper analyzed 
bi-modal FDI (wholly owned versus partially 
owned) decisions both into and within the EU. A 
limited-dependent-variable model was constructed 
to test hypotheses using FDI modal data of activity 
into and/or within the EU from the 100 largest food 
and beverage multinational enterprises.1 Figure 1 
Table 1. Regional Shares of FDI Inflows (1995–1998).
  FDI inflows
  1995 1996 1997 1998
Developed countries 63.30 58.90 58.90 71.50
European Union 35.10 30.40 27.20 35.70
Other Western Europe 1.80 1.80 1.90 1.20
United States 17.90 21.30 23.50 30.00
Japan - 0.10 0.70 0.50
Other developed countries 8.50 5.30 5.60 4.10
 
Developing countries 36.70 41.10 41.10 28.50
Africa 1.30 1.60 1.60 1.20
Latin America & Caribbean 10.00 12.70 14.70 11.10
Asia 20.70 22.90 20.60 13.20
Pacific 0.20 0.10 - -
Central & Eastern Europe 4.50 3.80 4.20 3.00
 
World 100 100 100 100
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1999.
1 The database covers the world’s 100 largest food and beverage 
companies, and was produced through 1998 by the Institut 
Agronomique de Montpellier (France).  Its sources are the 
Moody’s Industrial Manual, the Fortune Directory of the 500 
largest corporations, the “Dossier 5000” of the largest European 
companies published by “Le Nouvel Economiste,” Dun & 
Bradstreet International, the annual reports of the enterprises, 
and others. AGRODATA includes information at the firm level 
on sales value, number of employees, assets, profit, cash flow, 
equity, debt, type of firm (public, cooperative, etc.), year of 
creation, home country, number and name of host countries 
to which the firm has spread, and number of affiliates. At 
the affiliation level, it includes information on host country, 
percentage control of the parent, and UN-ISIC code.  
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compares the number of food and beverage FDI 
subsidiaries present in each region of the world in 
1985 and 1996. The compiled data shows a clear 
preference for FDI into the EU both in terms of 
number of subsidiaries and in the change in activity 
from 1985 to 1996. Agribusiness MNEs appeared 
to have aggressively invested into the EU, followed 
by a relatively even flow into Asia, South America, 
and North America. 
Many factors, both advantageous and constrain-
ing, are associated with the various modes of in-
vestment. A basic tenet of good business practices 
is assumed here: firms will carefully consider the 
alternatives. A primary method of developing 
a foreign business presence involves greenfield 
operations—investing in a new manufacturing 
plant or establishing a new division in another 
country. Other wholly owned subsidiaries may 
be established through stock purchases, mergers, 
and acquisitions. The decision to select full-invest-
ment modes usually occurs when the firm’s set of 
intrinsic strengths favor a go-it-alone strategy, and 
when those strengths dovetail with the host nation’s 
characteristics (i.e. familiarity with the local market, 
customs, laws, and other factors associated with 
operating in a foreign country).
On the other hand, the construction of overseas 
facilities is often constrained, difficult, or simply 
implausible. Though not generally the case in the 
EU, in some regions host governments may erect 
significant barriers to such activities or may simply 
apply political pressure to force a different strategy. 
Often firms find it in their best interest to work with 
a business partner who knows the market, has con-
tacts in government, is familiar with the culture and 
customs, or may own specific assets such as local 
distribution networks that are difficult to copy. In 
some scenarios, high political risks combined with 
unfamiliarity with the foreign market may make 
shared ownership structures more attractive than 
wholly owned ownership structures. This is espe-
cially true for smaller companies, which are more 
apt to lack international experience and to be con-
strained financially, and which may not possess the 
resources to gain the critical market knowledge that 
is so vital for a successful wholly owned overseas 
operation. 
One advantage of shared FDI, for example, in-
cludes risk-sharing and the ability to combine the 
strengths of different value chains. For example, a 
company with considerable knowledge of technol-
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Figure 1. Subsidiaries of the 100 Largest Multinational Food and Beverage Firms.
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seek a partner that possesses knowledge of and 
distribution assets within the appropriate market. 
Companies with limited capital resources might 
also seek partners able to jointly finance a project. 
Finally, partnering with a host nation firm may be 
the best way to overcome political, legal, and social 
barriers. 
The challenges to partially owned structures can 
be significant, and include finding ways to equitably 
share rewards and risks alike. In this global expan-
sion strategy, a company incurs significant costs 
associated with control and coordination issues. 
Potentially costly and destructive conflicts can arise 
from incomplete contracts or unforeseen or unpre-
dictable factors that arise over time. Cultural dif-
ferences between nations and between management 
styles of firms can present challenges as well. 
One focus of this study was to evaluate the po-
tential role of the Maastricht Treaty in reshaping 
FDI modal behavior. In 1992, the EU set in mo-
tion an ambitious program within the terms of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which envisaged some form of 
economic and monetary union (EMU) by the end 
of the decade. Dent (1997) discussed and identified 
five principal consequences of the Treaty: scaled 
economies from expanded markets across the EU, 
thereby leading to a reduction in both private- and 
public-sector costs; greater levels of competition 
through industrial reorganization across borders and 
a drive toward greater efficiency; increased compe-
tition in emerging markets and industries; increased 
research and technical innovation looking to capture 
markets and reduce costs; and a less-restrictive in-
vestment environment for firms looking to invest in 
the EU. In sum, one major purpose of the European 
integration was to improve its members’ competi-
tive position within the emerging global economy 
by reducing investment barriers and capturing scale 
economies. 
The balance of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: the next section presents an overview of 
the EU food and beverage industry and briefly 
incorporates the points from the Maastricht Treaty 
salient to this study. The third section contains the 
conceptual framework and the logit model of modal 
investment. The results are discussed in the fourth 
section, the fifth and final section offers some con-
cluding comments. 
Food and Beverage Industry and the EU
Food and beverage MNEs have invested abroad a 
variety of mergers, acquisitions, greenfield invest-
ments, joint ventures, and other types of partner-
ships (Agrodata 1998). These large MNEs control 
the lion’s share of overall revenue within the food 
and beverage industry worldwide (OECD 2006). 
For example, in 2002, the 10 largest agribusiness 
MNEs generated 12% of the income, and the 600 
largest firms controlled 50% of total revenues 
(OECD 2006). 
The agribusiness sector controls a large share of 
the EU’s aggregate manufacturing base, represent-
ing around 10.5% of all value-added outputs and 
11.5% of the workforce (estimated at 2.6 million 
workers). In addition, 40% of the production in this 
sector is concentrated in Germany and the United 
Kingdom, with another 40% in France, Spain, and 
Italy combined. Europe’s food and beverage sec-
tor is mainly composed of small enterprises—of 
277,000 companies, over 80% employ fewer than 
10 workers, accounting for around 20% of the total 
workforce. Meanwhile, companies with more than 
500 workers employ 30% of the workforce from 
all sectors. Most of the larger firms are MNEs; they 
possess large capital structures, boast well-known 
branded product lines, and use a variety of FDI 
modes (Agrodata 1998).
A Model of Modal Investment 
Firms have an array of options for investing in ways 
that best suit their specific purposes and corporate 
requirements. For instance, firms may export, ar-
range licensing agreements, or use other methods to 
lessen the costs of managing overseas subsidiaries 
(Liu 1997). Brigham and Houston (1978) suggest 
that MNEs may establish joint ventures in order to 
utilize said foreign firms’ experience and expertise. 
Finally, firms may invest directly by establishing 
wholly owned subsidiaries, by acquiring existing 
facilities, or by establishing joint ventures in which 
they partner as a minority with another foreign in-
vestor (Liu 1997). Following the work in Contractor 
and Kundu (1998) and later by Pan and Tse (2000), 
the theoretical foundation for this is study is that 
modal investment choice (M) is hypothesized as 
a function of firm (F) strengths, industry (I) char-
acteristics, and (C) country factors: M = f(F,I,C). 
Given that this study focuses exclusively on FDI 
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for the food and beverage industry alone, cross-
industry variables are not considered. The model 
used investment count data for FDI of the world’s 
100 largest food and beverage firms. Our empirical 
model addressed the following questions: 
1. How do political and market instability/
changes within the EU change the modal 
FDI decision? In particular, did the Maastricht 
Treaty significantly lower the barriers limiting 
wholly owned investment into the EU? 
2. How do socio-cultural factors influence 
modal investment patterns?
3. How do past FDI influence current FDI pat-
terns?
To address these questions, our sample was com-
posed of the 100 largest agri-food and beverage en-
terprises with operations in the EU (Agrodata 1998). 
We considered twelve of the fifteen EU members: 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and the UK from 1987 to 1998 (Austria, Finland, 
and Luxembourg experienced no investments within 
the study’s time frame). More-recent data was not 
available. Because we use lagged modal investment 
in constructing one explanatory variable, the model 
was estimated using data from 1990 to 1998, and 
amounted to 432 total observations. 
A binomial logit (hereafter logit) regression 
framework was selected for the empirical analysis 
because investments could be classified into two 
categories: wholly owned FDI and shared-owner-
ship FDI.2 Investment mode (INVEST), the depen-
dent variable, takes on qualitative values: zero for 
wholly owned FDI and one for shared FDI. Opera-
tional activities in the wholly owned group consist 
of acquisitions, plant construction, subsidiaries, 
and mergers in which 90% or more of the invested 
firm is purchased. The shared-ownership group 
includes co-enterprise agreements, partnerships, 
joint ventures, licensing, contractual agreements, 
franchising, and stock investments with less than 
90% equity ownership.
 The logit model derives the choice probabilities 
of a specific investment mode (type 0 or 1) as given 
below:3 
(1) Prob [Yi = 1|Xi] =      
1                          ,
1 + e
 −Xi  ß
where β is a vector of parameters linking the ith 
observation of each independent variable Xi to the 
ith observation of dependent variable Yi. The mar-
ginal effect, which quantifies the effects of the jth 
continuous independent variable over investment 
styles in probability terms, is given by:
(2) ∂Prob[Yi = 1|Xi] 
= ßj
 (
    e
 −Xi  ß
           ) ∂Xij        (1 + e
 −Xi  ß)2
Limdep version 8.0 was used in the estimation. 
It calculates the estimated parameters, inference 
statistics, and marginal effects at the mean of each 
variable. Limdep also provides prediction probabili-
ties, which are compared to the actual investment 
pattern. 
The X-vector contains the following set of 
variables:
(3)   X = [EINV, EU92, CB, EU92CB, LANG, EXEV] ,
where EINV is a measure of past investment pat-
terns for each firm in the study. The process of 
international expansion most certainly involves 
intrinsic firm-level assets such as past experiences 
and know-how. In particular, firms with a high level 
of expertise in shared- or wholly owned modal in-
vestment patterns are assumed to be more capable 
of duplicating those strategies in the future. Addi-
tionally, past modal patterns are likely to implicitly 
carry information about each firm’s strategic and 
marketing plans, its product mix, and its internally 
derived assessment of  risk its investments are likely 
to carry. Developing a single variable to capture 
past investment patterns proved implausible be-
cause many of the investments were initiated with 
no past investment, and marginal effects near zero 
are difficult to interpret. In this study, a variable for 
past investment (EINV) was constructed using the 
exponential form
(4) EINV = exp(inv0t-3
 + inv0t-2 + inv0t-1
 – inv1t-3
 
– inv1t-2 – inv1t-1
 ) ,
2 An unordered-choice model between wholly owned 
investments and shared-ownership investments can be 
motivated by a random utility model or other similar conceptual 
framework (Greene 2000).
3 To eliminate extreme outliers, which made solving the model 
difficult, EINV variable was bounded to E± 05. The model 
results were not sensitive to E±04 boundaries.
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where inv0 are wholly owned FDI and inv1 are 
shared investments. Obviously, EINV is positively 
related to wholly owned FDI; thus a negative pa-
rameter estimate is anticipated. 
EU92 is a binary variable (zero through 1992 
and one afterwards) used to capture any changes 
in the modal investment climate occurring after the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
Political risk is a major concern for international 
companies; indeed, changes in the political or mar-
ket climate in the host country may threaten operat-
ing positions. For example, a foreign company may 
lose its operations through governmental takeovers 
of property; said takeovers may or may not include 
compensation. Still, despite the near-universal 
recognition of political risk among multinational 
corporations, political scientists, and economists, 
there remains no consensus regarding what exactly 
constitutes that risk or how to measure it (Shapiro 
1996). At the same time, a number of commercial 
and academic risk-forecasting models are available. 
These models normally supply country risk indices 
that attempt to quantify the level of risk within each 
nation. Most of these indices rely on some measures 
of local stability. Models such as BERI are use-
ful, as they measure the general level of stability 
within a given country (BERI 1999). In the period 
of our study, the European Union was socially and 
economically stable and the aforementioned indices 
show virtually no change over time. 
In February of 1992, the Maastricht Treaty 
signed into law arguably the most sweeping ar-
ray of political reform for this region since WWII. 
Although monetary union negotiations extend far 
back into European history, the convergence of the 
Maastricht Treaty is the most comprehensive. As a 
consequence, 1992 is a key year for Europe because 
of the ensuing economic and political adjustments. 
By effectively reducing national autonomy when 
setting investment policies (in lieu of an overall EU 
policy), firms could expect to see a changing payoff 
structure over their modal choice sets. Specifically, 
it is hypothesized that firms would be more likely 
to choose a go-it-alone strategy after the elements 
of Maastricht were made public. The eventual an-
nouncement of a single EU currency was likely to 
have a similar effect; this effect in turn was more 
likely to be more pronounced for firms in the EU. 
To elaborate from a budgetary standpoint, compa-
nies face currency risk in terms of profit and capital 
flows alike. A unified currency reduces the level of 
risk-sharing within the capital investment stage, and 
this lowered risk supports a hypothesis suggesting 
an increase in wholly owned FDI modes. 
An obvious joint hypothesis problem emerges 
when interpreting a time-dummy variable such as 
EU92. Perhaps additional economic or financial 
phenomena also encouraged a change in modal 
investment patterns. It is impossible to ascertain 
whether such shocks were or were not present, and 
none could be uncovered in an exhaustive literature 
search.4 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reforms of the early 1990s may have had some im-
pact on the investment climate for food-processing 
firms, but nothing relevant to modal investment pat-
terns could be uncovered (see Dent 1997, Scheele 
1996, Tozanli 1996, and ISMEA 1999). The same 
conclusion can be drawn easily from the events 
surrounding the early 1990s collapse of the So-
viet Union sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. 
While it seems clear that the Soviet Union collapse 
prompted new incentive for FDI flows to the EU, 
the overall set of factors that alter modal decisions 
did not seem to change.
A second issue relates to the timing of invest-
ments and the 1992 announcement: why would the 
announcement stage change the modal investment 
climate, and why would the implementation stage(s) 
fail to do so? Investments are made on the basis of 
long-term returns and on strategic behavior in capi-
tal deemed possible among rivals. The announce-
ment stage set in motion a structural change, a 
change most likely to be viewed through a long-run 
game-theoretic lens that involves the strike prices 
of real growth options on investment (Grenadier 
2000). Indeed, it would be foolish to think that firms 
would choose a modal investment without care-
fully examining the long-run ramifications made 
possible by the Treaty. Therefore, if wholly owned 
FDI modes are deemed more preferable once the 
Treaty was operational, it is reasonable that delays 
in new shared FDI activity, shifts in strategies from 
shared to wholly owned FDI investments, and more 
aggressive wholly owned FDI investment would be-
gin to occur shortly following the announcement. 
4 One finding involving structural shifts occurred in the 
electronics sector. Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998) conducted 
an extensive study of tariff-jumping FDI into the EU, relying 
on a model similar to the one used here.  They found significant 
support for tariff-jumping FDI activity in a panel of electronics 
firms.  These policy shifts varied across the different electronics 
sectors and occurred in various years between 1985–1988.
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Much of the FDI in our dataset actually ema-
nates from within the EU. CB is the common-border 
binary variable and as such takes a value of one 
when the home and host nations share a common 
border. EU92CB is the interaction term between 
CB and EU92. Finally, LANG is a language binary 
term equal to zero when the home and host nations 
share the same first language. These variables are 
important because cultural and spatial connections 
are expected to influence the modal investments of 
multinational companies. Prior research has shown 
that control ventures shared with host-country firms 
help to alleviate uncertainties arising from socio-
cultural differences (Beamish and Banks 1998; 
Harrigan 1985; Klien, Frazer, and Roth 1990). Con-
sequently, shared control structures enable foreign 
firms to reduce their risk by sharing equity with and 
assigning management tasks to local partners. In-
deed, such partners may be better able to manage the 
local labor force and the various complex relation-
ships with suppliers, buyers, and the governments 
in their respective countries (Root 1994).
In this study, we have chosen language and a 
cross-border binary variable as proxies for cultural 
similarities and psychic distance, respectively. 
LANG takes the value one (zero) if the language 
spoken in the investor’s home country and the host 
country is (is not) the same. For example, this vari-
able takes the value one if a U.S. company invests 
in the U.K.; it is zero if the U.S. firm invests in 
France. We expect LANG will be positively related 
to wholly owned FDI modes and thus will carry a 
negative parameter estimate. A cross-border dummy 
variable (CB) takes the value one (zero) if there 
is (is not) a common border between the investor 
and the host country. The risk of wholly owned 
FDI modes is likely to increase in proportion to 
distance between the home nation and the FDI 
location. Therefore, we expect CB to be positively 
related to wholly owned FDI, and thus anticipate a 
negative parameter. 
Obviously, many non-cultural barriers to invest-
ment should be evaluated carefully by a multina-
tional (i.e. access to capital, tax rates, labor rates, 
etc.). Because the Maastricht Treaty essentially 
moved the EU toward a much more unified struc-
ture, cultural barriers could begin to take a more 
prominent role in choosing a modal investment. 
As a consequence, an interaction term between 
EU92 and CB (noted as EU92CB) is included in 
the model. It is anticipated that firms are less likely 
to consider non-cultural factors when choosing a 
country for investment and that nations that share 
a geographic border are even more likely to adhere 
to sole venture-investment patterns. 
Finally, variations in exchange rates (EXEC) are 
caused by economic factors, governmental deci-
sions, and the overall political stability of a country. 
If FDI expansion occurs, key considerations include 
access to the invested capital and its earnings in 
the host-country currency. This concept of liquidity 
preference is a common theory that helps explain 
capital-budgeting decisions, and can be applied to 
international-expansion decisions. Liquidity-prefer-
ence theory assumes that investors prefer that some 
of their holdings be in highly liquid assets, which 
usually provide a lower return. Liquidity is neces-
sary in part to free-up funds for near-term payments, 
such as paying out dividends, and also to cover un-
expected expenses such as stockpiling materials if a 
strike threatens supply. Finally, liquidity permits a 
shift in funds to even more profitable opportunities, 
such as purchasing materials at a discount during a 
temporary price depression (Daniels and Radebaugh 
1994). A downside of maintaining highly liquid as-
sets in other countries involves their vulnerability to 
exchange-rate volatilities. Because wholly owned 
investment strategies tend to be less liquid and 
involve a stronger commitment to maintaining a 
presence in the host nation, we anticipate a negative 
relationship between exchange rate-volatility and 
wholly owned investment patterns, and therefore a 
positive parameter estimate. EXEV was calculated 
simply as the percentage change in the exchange 
rate from year t–1 to t.
Results
Table 2 details the variables used in the model and 
the descriptive statistics for each variable. Table 3 
contains the results from a preliminary analysis of 
collinearity between variables in the data set. No 
evidence of problematic collinearity was found. Af-
ter obtaining coefficient estimates, we first tested the 
null hypothesis that the model variables jointly do 
not explain modal investment: H0: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 
= β5 = β6 = 0. The test statistic from the likelihood-
ratio test [2 * (LRunrestricted – LRrestricted) = 45.2152] 
exceeded the critical chi-square value (χ2
0.005,n = 
16.7496 for n = 5). Thus the null hypothesis was 
rejected, leading to a conclusion that the variables 
jointly explain investment modes. 
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Table 2. Model Variables: Variable Names and Descriptive Statistics.
Dependent variable:
INVESTi  Investment type i with i = 0: Wholly owned; i = 1: Shared ownership
Independent variables:
LANG  Language: 1 if the investor and host country speak the same language, 0 
otherwise
CB Cross-Border; 1if the investor and host country are neighbors, 0 otherwise
EXE Exchange rate fluctuation t -1 to t for host country c
EU92 European Union dummy variable taking the value 1 (0) after (before) the 
Maastrict Treaty in 1992.
EU92CB An interaction term between CB and EU92 = (EU92 * CB)
EINV exp(inv0t-3 + inv0 t-2 + inv0 t-1 – inv1t-3 – inv1t-2 – inv1t-1)
Descriptive statistics 
Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
EINV 11413.00 53272.0 4.54E-05 5.32E+05
EU92 621673.0 0.48543 0 1
CB 0.342205 0.47490 0 1
EU92CB 0.136882 0.34405 0 1
LANG 0.169202 0.37529 0 1
EXEV -0.539677 10.1683 -20.09 21.74
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of the Model Variables.
EINV EU92 CB EU92CB LANG EXEV
EINV 1
EU92 -0.10813 1
CB 0.06799 -0.03223 1
EU92CB 0.13361 -0.51049 0.55213 1
LANG 0.2616 0.05929 0.12337 0.2681 1
EXEV -0.05952 0.39161 -0.06619 -0.23105 0.02377 1
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The coefficient estimation results are reported in 
Table 4. All the variables in the model are significant 
at the 5-percent level, and all but the coefficient on 
the CB variable maintained the anticipated sign. 
However, the sign on the CB variable is less prob-
lematic than it could be because it is offset by the 
interaction term involving EU92. We discuss this 
more fully below from a perspective that considers 
the marginal effects of each variable. 
In a standard linear model, one may assume that 
the coefficients obtained in the statistical analysis 
have only marginal effects. However, for a logit 
model, which is nonlinear by definition, the mar-
ginal effects defined in Equation 2 must be consid-
ered in any relevant interpretation of continuous 
variables (EINV and EXEV). For the discrete shift 
variables (EU92, LANG, and CB), we simply in-
terpret parameter estimates to identify directions in 
shifts of probability. 
Table 4 also reports the marginal effects of 
the continuous independent variables, comparing 
shared to wholly owned FDI modes.5 Past modal 
investment behavior has a statistically significant ef-
fect on the probability of current modal investment 
behavior. Due to the exponential function used to 
measure past investment patterns, combined with 
the discrete count data used in the study, increases 
and decreases in shared or wholly owned FDI modes 
generate different marginal effects. At the mean of 
the data, for every additional past wholly owned 
investment or every reduction in past shared invest-
ment, the probability of a wholly owned invest-
ment increased by 23 percent. For every increase 
in shared investment or every drop in past wholly 
owned investment, the probability of a wholly 
owned investment declined by 9 percent.6 We also 
found that an incremental increase in exchange-
rate variability (EXEV) increases the probability 
of shared FDI modes by a small but statistically 
significant percentage (0.0057%). 
Shifts in probability that relate to discrete chang-
es in the binary variables are presented in Table 5 
(continuous variables ENIV and EXEC are set to 
their mean values). The first column of zeros rep-
resents the base-case probabilities that apply when 
an investment was made prior to 1992 in a nation 
that lacks a common border or a common language 
Table 4. Model Results.
Coefficient estimates:
Variable Coefficient t-statistic P-value
EINV –0.0000202 –2.667 0.007
EU92 –1.1412080 –5.957 0.000
CB  0.9439203  3.175 0.015
EU92CB –1.0188463 –2.481 0.013
LANG –0.6404920 –1.881 0.060
EXEV 0.02762396  2.548 0.011
Characteristics in numerator of Prob [Y = shared investment]
Marginal effects:
Variable Coefficient t-statistic P-value
EINV –0.0000042 –2.884 0.004
EXEV 0.00577288 2.589 0.009
Marginal Effects on Prob [Y = shared investment]
5 In a binomial logit framework (as opposed to a multinomial), 
the marginal effects on the probability of choosing investment 
mode 1 (partial investment) are equal but opposite in sign to 
the probability of choosing wholly owned FDI.  As a result, we 
will continue to draw inferences to wholly owned FDI when 
discussing the marginal effects.
6 The reasons for these conclusions are quite simple.  Unit 
increases in our function for past investment increase the 
function by 171 percent.  Unit decreases cause the function 
to drop by 63 percent.  Thus at the mean of the data the first 
measure is calculated as 0.0000042*171*11413/0.35=23%.
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with the home nation. As reported, the probability 
of a wholly owned investment under the base case 
was 56 percent. The second column represents the 
discrete change in probability that occurs when 
the home and host nations share the same base 
language. A major finding concluded that a home 
nation with the same base language as the host na-
tion is the most likely candidate for wholly owned 
ownership investments, shifting the probability of 
wholly owned investment upwards by 14 percent 
(from 56 percent to 70 percent).
The other major findings related to discrete-
variable changes jointly involve the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and cross-border impacts. 
As expected, the negative coefficient on EU92 in-
dicates the Treaty shifted the probability of wholly 
owned FDI upwards by 24 percent, to 80 percent. 
The probability of wholly owned investments were 
further enhanced to 92 percent when considering 
host-nation investments in neighboring nations 
(nations with a common border), with a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term EU92CB (both 
EU92 = 1 and CB = 1). 
The cross-border parameter did not have the 
anticipated sign, and instead suggested that firms 
were 23 percent less likely to choose wholly owned 
FDI when investing in nations that share a common 
geographic border to the host nation (56 percent 
vs. 33 percent). Certainly, it is not implausible to 
suggest that firms seek levels of control that in-
crease in proportion to their geographic distance 
from their investments. And perhaps the locational 
impacts imply that firms are most aware of com-
petitor firms nearby, with whom they are best able 
to develop the sophisticated relationships that lead 
to joint firm activities. Regardless of the reason, 
the cross-border impacts of shared investments 
were completely offset after 1992 when the Maas-
tricht Treaty encouraged more wholly owned FDI 
modes with neighboring nations. More specifically, 
for CB=1 and EU92=1 the probability of a wholly 
owned investment increased from 56 percent  to 
92 percent. Indeed, it appears that the Treaty broke 
some of the investment ties that spatially close firms 
may have had, and caused them to seek new avenues 
of investment patterns. 
A conventional goodness-of-fit measure in logit 
analysis is the prediction table, which summarizes 
how well the model coefficients actually classify 
each observation (see Table 5). From a total of 149 
Table 5. Summary Results.
Probability shifts of discrete variables
Variable Value of discrete variable 
LANG 0 1 0 0 0
EU92 0 0 1 0 1
CB 0 0 0 1 1
EU92xCB 0 0 0 0 1
Prob [Y = Wholly owned investment] 0.56 0.70 0.80 0.33 0.92
Prob [Y =Partial investment] 0.44 0.30 0.20 0.66 0.08
Determined at mean of continuous variables (EINV=11413, EXEV=-.53968)
Prediction table
0 1 Actual
0 263 20 283
1 109 40 149
Predicted 372 60 432
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observations for shared-ownership investments, 
only 40 are predicted with this model, a mere 27-
percent predictability: [(40*100)/149] ≅ 27 percent. 
On the other hand, the model performed very well 
in predicting wholly owed ownership cases, with 
almost 93-percent accuracy: [(263*100)/283] ≅ 93 
percent. Overall, the general predictability of this 
model remains satisfactory, with a 70-percent suc-
cess ratio: [(263+40)*100/432] ≅ 70 percent. 
Conclusion
This paper generates a better understanding of 
modal FDI into the EU. The model examined a va-
riety of key variables to explain the binary choice 
between an aggregated set of wholly owned FDI 
modes versus shared FDI modes. We found that the 
Maastricht Treaty and cross-border effects taking 
place after the Treaty was signed in 1992 had the 
greatest joint impact on investment patterns. Spe-
cifically, the Treaty encouraged more wholly owned 
FDI modes and dampened the tendency for firms 
in neighboring nations to jointly invest. It appears 
the Treaty had a temporary pro-competitive effect, 
at least at the level of capital planning during the 
years of this study. 
All other results conformed to current investment 
theories. Past firm-level investment activity played 
an important role in determining future investment 
behavior. Firms that established an investment style 
were found to be more likely to follow that same 
pattern. Increased exchange-rate volatility led to 
lower probabilities for wholly owned investments. 
Firms were found more likely to make wholly 
owned investments when the home and host na-
tions shared a common language. 
Obviously, many factors go into a decision to for-
eign direct invest, and the mode of investment only 
adds to that complexity. The research in this study 
attempts to clarify and enlighten our understanding 
of some of the major factors that influence firm in-
vestment patterns. Our results clearly suggest that 
macroeconomic forces, intrafirm strengths/abilities, 
and socioeconomic and geographic factors all have 
an influential role. Future research on foreign direct 
investment should investigate more specifically how 
these forces drive investment. These results should 
guide future government policy recommendations. It 
is also important for international agencies to monitor 
the activities of large multinationals and to collect data 
useful for public-policy analysis of their activities. 
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